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liament (EP). This is a relevant question because while the Ombudsman is appointed by and reports to the EP, it can also
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used to operationalize the concept of independence. We conclude that the Ombudsman acts independently and is not
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1. Introduction
The academic debate on the European Union’s (EU)
democratic deficit has been described as being ‘crowded
waters’ (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007). This article con-
tributes to one strand of this ‘crowded’ debate, namely
that of ‘procedural’ legitimacy (Lord & Magnette, 2004).
According to this view, legitimacy may be enhanced as
long as certain procedures—such as transparency, bal-
ance of interests, proportionality, legal certainty and the
consultation of stakeholders—are adhered to, so as to
increase public accountability (Meijer, Grimmelikhuijsen,
& Brandsma, 2009).
The creation of the European Ombudsman (EO)1 in
1995 represents perhaps the strongest illustration of
the growing importance given to procedural legitimiza-
tion in the EU. The EO is expressly tasked with inves-
tigating maladministration within EU institutions and
bodies—therefore, it constitutes a channel of scrutiny
dedicated exclusively to how public officials carry out
their activities.
Although academic research regarding the EO is
rather scant, most existing contributions highlight the
success of this institution. Magnette (2003) argues that,
despite some initial scepticism, the EO managed to de-
fine and disseminate a set of defining principles of ‘good
1 Throughout this article, we also refer to the European Ombudsman as ‘the Ombudsman’, or, alternatively, by using the abbreviation EO.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 40–50 40
administration’, and more generally contributed to wide-
ranging reforms in European governance. Along similar
lines, Kostadinova’s (2015) systematic analysis of cases
spanning a period of over 15 years demonstrated that
EU institutions have accepted a significant share of the
EO’s recommendations, which lead to the implementa-
tion of practices that boosted both their transparency
and accountability.
Taking as a premise this rather positive account of the
EO’s performance, we focus on its ‘hybrid’ nature as a
‘cross-over’ between parliamentary control body and ju-
dicial organ (on this see Magnette, 2003). To be clear, on
the one hand, the EO is appointed by and reports to the
European Parliament (EP).2 On the other hand, it inde-
pendently investigates cases brought to its attention and
solves them by defining and applying ‘general principles’
(much in the manner of a court of law). This ambiguity
makes for a rather paradoxical relationship with the EP,
which formally appoints the EO, while at the same time
being potentially subject to its investigations in instances
of alleged maladministration, as with any other EU body
or agency.
The question thus poses itself whether the EO acts as
an ‘independent’ institution as stipulated in the Treaty.
As the concept of independence is difficult to grasp, it
will be operationalized bymeans of certain roles that will
be inductively drawn from the analysis of cases brought
in front of the EO and against the EP. The conceptual-
ization of roles is thus derived in a bottom-up (induc-
tive) fashion, through the empirical analysis of all deci-
sions following an inquiry by the EO in cases against the
EP for a period of more than ten years (January 2004–
May 2015). This period was chosen to cover two com-
plete legislative terms of the EP (i.e., 2004–2009 and
2009–2014), and thework of two out of the three people
who have served as EOs so far, namely Nikiforos Diman-
dorous (2003–2013) and Emily O’Reilly (2013–present).3
Furthermore, given the relative infrequency of inquiries
against the EP, this rather lengthy time-frame also en-
ables us to cover sufficient cases to be able to trace con-
sistent patterns over time. In sum, these research design
choices allow our findings to be generalizable.
Note that the thrust of the data used in this article is
towards the ‘internal’ politics of the EU in general, and
of the EP in particular (see Leino, 2017, in this issue).
Not only has the EP a great role to play within this do-
main due to its co-legislative function (Hix & Hoyland,
2013), but also the cases brought to the EO mostly focus
on internal EP issues (such as staff matters). Neverthe-
less, the role of the EP in the ‘external’ politics of the EU
has been upgraded since the Lisbon Treaty, as the Parlia-
ment gained the right to veto international trade agree-
ments, to just give one example (Rosén, 2016). To reflect
these developments, but also to show how the EO en-
gages the EP when it is acting in a more entrepreneurial
manner, we complement the case analysis with a discus-
sion of two landmark own-initiative inquiries of the EO.
One of these concerns the internal/ institutional politics
of the EU (case OI/8/2015/JAS, on the transparency of
trilogues), while the other relates to the external dimen-
sion of the EU (caseOI/11/2014/RA, on transparency and
public participation in the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership [TTIP] negotiations) (see Gheyle & De
Ville, 2017, in this issue).
Due to the fact that there were no own-initiative in-
quiries which targeted the EP exclusively, we chose to
focus on two cases that involved the EP together with
other institutional players, namely the European Com-
mission and the Council of the EU. These two particu-
lar inquiries are relevant for our analysis for two reasons.
Firstly, they both deal with domains of activity and prac-
tices that have been traditionallymarked by secrecy. Con-
sequently, one of the main endeavours of the EO, the ad-
vancement of institutional transparency, is likely to come
up against significant institutional resistance, including
on behalf of the EP. These inquiries are thus significant
tests for the EO’s independence. Secondly, this choice
of cases allows us to contrast a situation where the EO
aligned with the EP to challenge the Commission and
the Council (i.e., the TTIP inquiry) with one where the
EO acted alone to challenge all three institutions equally
(i.e., the trilogues inquiry) (see Abazi &Adriaensen, 2017,
in this issue).
Observing this contrast is relevant for the EO’s inde-
pendence because it shows uswhether or not an alliance
with the EP has an impact on its activity.
The article proceeds as follows: the following section
presents the attributions and the powers of the EO. Then
we present an account of cases against the EP, which
were brought forward to the EO. Based on this, we define
two main roles assumed by the EO, and show how they
are linked to the different subject matters of the cases
under review. The third section deals with the aforemen-
tioned own-initiative inquiries and brings to light a third
role played by the EP. Conclusions follow.
2. The Office of the EO and Its Relationship with the EP
The relationship between the EO and the EP can be
meaningfully viewed through the lenses of agency the-
ory. We build here on Majone’s (2001) seminal distinc-
tion between two logics of delegation: on one hand,
the logic of efficiency, where the principals’ core aim is
to reduce transaction costs and take advantage of the
agent’s expertise, and, on the other hand, the logic of
credibility, where delegation serves to render the prin-
cipals’ (policy) commitments trustworthy by shielding
them from ex-post legislative or administrative tinker-
ing. This second type of delegation is prevalent where
principals may face short-term interests to default on
2 Throughout this article, we also refer to the European Parliament as ‘the Parliament’, or, alternatively, by using the abbreviation EP.
3 When referring specifically to the person occupying the EO position (rather than the institution of the EO in general), we use masculine pronouns (‘he’,
‘him’ etc.) for the period of Mr. Diamandouros’ tenure, and feminine pronouns (‘she’, ‘her’ etc.) for that of Ms. O’Reilly.
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their initial commitments, and/or where there are repu-
tational benefits to be reaped by having an agent whose
decisions are not ‘contaminated’ by politics (Alter, 2008;
Majone, 2001). In the EU, relevant examples of such
‘fiduciary’ agents or ‘trustees’—as they are called in the
literature—include the European Central Bank, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice, and the European Commission
in some of its functions (Franchino, 2002; Majone, 2001;
Pollack, 2007).
The different rationales for delegation presented
above have far-reaching implications for the relation-
ship between principals and agents. As Alter (2008) and
Handke (2010) show, traditional agents are chosen be-
cause they have similar views and values to their princi-
pals, and are expected to execute their duties as if rep-
resenting their principals. By contrast, trustees are se-
lected primarily due to reputational and professional cre-
dentials, which may sometimes mean that their values
are systematically different from those of their principals.
Furthermore, trustees enjoy comparatively more discre-
tion and are expected to carry out their mandates ac-
cording to their own professional norms and best judge-
ment. Importantly, while traditional agents act on be-
half of their principals, trustees act on behalf of a third
party—a beneficiary—towards whom both the trustees
and their principals are bound. This beneficiary can be
an artificial construction, for instance, the citizens in a
democratic polity (Alter, 2008; Gehring & Plocher, 2009).
Due to these factors, the principals’ control over trustees
is significantly looser compared to traditional agents—
in particular, once appointed, a trustee will be less vul-
nerable to re-contracting sanctions (i.e., dismissal, bud-
get cuts, re-writing of their mandate). These fundamen-
tal differences in both the rationale of delegation and
the relationship between the relevant parties have led
some authors (e.g., Alter, 2008; Handke, 2010) to argue
that fiduciary relations cannot be adequately captured
by the principal-agent model, while dissenting voices
(e.g., Brandsma&Adriaensen, 2017; Pollack, 2007) point
out that this is not the case as Majone’s (2001) two
logics of delegation represent opposite ends of the
same continuum (as opposed to being dichotomous cat-
egories) and no trustee is ever fully independent from
its principal(s).
It is beyond our scope to settle this theoretical dis-
pute here. Rather, we draw on the distinction between
traditional and trustee agents, presented above, to eval-
uate the independence of the EO vis-à-vis the EP, both
from the standpoint of institutional design, as well as
inquiry activity. In this section, we show that Majone’s
(2001) second logic of delegation applies in the case of
the EO. While on paper the EO benefits from guaran-
tees which are characteristic of trustees, we nonetheless
identify two constraints on its independence, both stem-
ming from its close relationship to the EP. The impact of
these constraints will be assessed in the following sec-
tion by looking at how the EO handles complaints against
the EP.
2.1. The EO as a Trustee Agent
The EO is a trustee appointed by the EP: the EP alone
elects the Ombudsman, with no role for the Member
States or other European Institutions. To be accepted in
the selection process via the EP, a candidate needs the
support of at least 40 Members of the European Parlia-
ment (MEPs), from at least two EUmember states. Those
declared admissible are asked to present their priorities
in a hearing in front the EP Committee on Petitions. The
new Ombudsman is elected by secret ballot and by a ma-
jority of the votes cast. In line with what the literature
suggests regarding the primacy of reputational and pro-
fessional credentials in the appointment of trustees, the
EP has so far chosen candidates with a history of being
national Ombudsmen, and who were independent from
the European Institutions and from their respective na-
tional governments (Former General Secretary of the EO,
personal communication, May 11, 2015).
In line with Art. 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU), the EO’s main function is
to inquire into and report on instances of maladministra-
tion arising from activities of the EU institutions and bod-
ies (only the Court of Justice of the EU, when acting in
its judicial capacity, falls outside the EO’s mandate). This
represents a rather broad mandate, which as suggested
by Handke (2010) is typical for trustee delegation (tradi-
tional agents are authorised for a narrower remit, often
for a single purpose). It also suggests that the EO acts not
as a representative of the EP, but on behalf of a distinct
beneficiary—namely, in defending ‘good administration’,
the EO ‘serves’ the European citizens, who have a right
to be treated appropriately by the EU institutions.
Importantly, neither the Treaty nor the Statute of the
EO define ‘maladministration’. This has allowed the EO
to actively shape the limits of its own mandate. It has
done so by consistently adhering to the position that
‘maladministration’ refers to unlawful behaviour and er-
rors of legal interpretation, but it also goes beyond this
by including failure to respect principles of good admin-
istration or fundamental rights (Harden, 2005). This in-
terpretation results in a rather wide remit for the EO
(Harden, 2008).
Particularly significant for the EO’s status as a trustee
is that it enjoys operational independence—meaning,
it decides alone regarding the opening of inquiries, ei-
ther in response to complaints from citizens or residents
of the Union, or based on its own initiative. Art 228
TFEU states in no uncertain terms that the EO ‘shall be
completely independent in the performance of his du-
ties’ and furthermore ‘shall neither seek nor take in-
structions from any government, institution, body, office
or entity’.
Finally, the EO reports to the EP, insofar as it is re-
quired to present it with an annual activity report. How-
ever, it is significant that the EP cannot dismiss the EO
on its own, but has to request that the European Court
of Justice does so, and only on account of the EO’s overall
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functioning or for ‘serious misconduct’. Symbolically, the
EO gives an oath to perform duties with ‘complete inde-
pendence and impartiality’ (European Parliament, 1994)
before the Court, not before the EP. In terms of budget,
too, the EO is outside of the Parliament’s direct control:
being one of the seven formal institutions of the EU, its
budget represents an independent section of the EU bud-
get and is hence decided jointly by the EP and the Council,
based on the Commission’s proposal.
In conclusion, insofar as institutional design is con-
cerned, the EO and the EP fit the characteristics of a typ-
ical trustee-principal relationship. Namely, while the EP
has exclusive prerogatives in appointing the EO, it does
not wield any other re-contracting tools. Thus, it cannot
dismiss the EO alone (but can only ask the ECJ to con-
sider doing so), it does not directly control its budget,
and, although the Statute of the EO is formally an EP deci-
sion, it cannot fundamentally re-write the EO’s mandate,
as the crucial provisions (i.e., its mission to investigate
instances of maladministration and the guarantees of
operational independence) are inscribed in the Treaties,
namely Art 228 TFEU.
2.2. Constraints on the Independence of the EO
Although the EO does enjoy a broad mandate, its pow-
ers are, as Peters (2005) observes, more modest com-
pared to some of its national counterparts. Most signifi-
cantly, the EO lacks the power to refer suspected illegal-
ities to the courts, which—among other factors—leads
it to cultivate a cooperative style of control. Concretely,
in cases where maladministration is found, the EO has
no way of obliging the institution concerned to take any
redress measures. Instead, what it can do is attempt rec-
onciliation by proposing a ‘solution’ to which both par-
ties may submit observations. If the solution is accepted,
this usually means that the offending institution has ad-
mitted wrongdoing, apologised to the complainant, and
offered compensation for any damages (Cadeddu, 2004).
In more serious cases, the EO may also choose to is-
sue recommendations, where it proposes guidelines for
good administrative practice to prevent similar instances
ofmaladministration fromoccurring in the future. The in-
stitution concerned has three months to send a detailed
opinion on the draft recommendations, in which it ex-
plains whether and how these would be implemented.
Additionally, the EO has at its disposal two other ac-
tions which are not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties
or its Statute, but which have been shaped by practice
over the years. Thus, the option of ‘further remarks’ al-
lows the EO to make recommendations to the institu-
tion concerned even if nomaladministration is found. On
the other hand, ‘critical remarks’ are used when the in-
stitution cannot be persuaded to rectify the matter, or
in situations where maladministration is of such nature
that it cannot be rectified. The follow-upmeasures taken
as a response to critical remarks are published annually.
Cadeddu (2004) notes that ‘critical remarks’ are gener-
ally used in cases where the maladministration has no
general or serious implications.
The ‘sharpest’ tool in the EO’s arsenal is the spe-
cial report to the EP, which only applies in cases ‘of sig-
nificant public interest’ (European Ombudsman, 2016a,
p. 4), and where the Ombudsman has issued recommen-
dations, but the offending institution has failed to satis-
factorily accept them. The importance of special reports
lies in the fact that they must be debated within the EP
and as such they receive political attention. Therefore,
although the institution under inquiry cannot be obliged
to rectify maladministration, it can be directed towards
compliance through public ‘naming-and-shaming’. Spe-
cial reports are used very sparsely (the EO has produced
only 19 by the end of 2016), precisely because they are
considered ‘of inestimable value’ for the EO’s work and
regarded as its ‘ultimateweapon’ (Former General Secre-
tary of the EO, personal communication, May 11, 2015).
To sum up, even though the EO’s mandate provides
it with a broad remit, its inability to take binding deci-
sions leads the Ombudsman to rely exclusively on the
‘soft’ power of persuasion to move EU institutions to ac-
tion. Here, the EO’s status as a trustee appointed by the
Parliament becomes particularly relevant. Namely, to be
successful, the Ombudsman must be able to convince
other EU institutions (and European citizens more gener-
ally) that it is, in fact, independent and impartial, and not
simply an auxiliary organ controlled by the EP. Otherwise,
it is doubtful that its proposed solutions and recommen-
dations would have any force of persuasion or even be
taken seriously.
On the other hand, however, in extreme cases of non-
cooperation from the EU institutions, success depends
not so much on the EO being perceived as independent,
but on its ability to leverage the ‘political muscle’ of the
EP in support of its actions. This is clearly illustrated by
the special reports, an instrument that is seldom used
but has general significance for the EO, as it strength-
ens its hand in interactions with other EU institutions. As
highlighted by former EO Nikiforos Diamandouros, the
mere possibility of a special report might ‘persuade the
institution or body concerned to alter its position’ (Euro-
pean Ombudsman, 2006)—meaning, the EO conducts at
least some of its inquiries ‘in the shadow’ of this instru-
ment. The strategy can be effective but only so long as
the special report represents a credible threat. This situ-
ation creates strong incentives for the EO to cultivate a
positive, co-operative relationship with the EP. This does
not automatically diminish its independence as a trustee,
but it does put a constraint on it.
A second constraint on the independence of the EO
comes from an overlap of its responsibilities with those
of the EP’s Petitions Committee (PC). Any maladminis-
tration complaint that the Ombudsman receives could
equally be submitted as a petition to the PC (Peters,
2005). In fact, in the early debates concerning the cre-
ation of the EO, the EP majority proved reluctant to dele-
gate, as the Parliament had always considered itself to
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be the guardian of citizens’ rights vis-à-vis other Euro-
pean Institutions, and the PC already provided a channel
for collecting and addressing citizens’ complaints (Mag-
nette, 2003). The unclear demarcation of roles between
the EP PC and the EO could potentially result in a situ-
ation where the former sees the latter as its adversary
and tries to hinder its work by, for instance by cutting
resources—or, conversely, it might try to ‘subordinate’
the Ombudsman to its needs, i.e., to have the EO do ded-
icated work for the Committee (Former General Secre-
tary of the EO, personal communication, May 11, 2015).
In other words, due to the overlap between their respon-
sibilities, a risk exists that the EP would try to control the
EO as if it were a traditional agent and not a trustee en-
joying discretion over the execution of its own mandate.
These scenarios, however, have not come to pass, as
both parties have made efforts to informally define lines
of separation between their respective activities. Thus,
in time, it became obvious that the petitions which rep-
resent the ‘bread and butter’ of the PC generally concern
the Member States’ alleged failure to comply with EU
law, and hencematters that lie outside the EO’smandate
(Former General Secretary of the EO, personal commu-
nication, May 11, 2015). For its part, the Ombudsman
chose to navigate the ambiguous relationship with the
EP by adhering—at least on paper—to the principle that
the political work of the EP is outside its mandate, and
that the concept of maladministration does not include
the work of EP committees.4 This is apparent in the very
first annual report of the Ombudsman:
All complaints against decisions of a political rather
than an administrative nature are regarded as inad-
missible; for example, complaints against the political
work of the European Parliament or its organs, such
as decisions of the Committee on Petitions. (European
Ombudsman, 1996, p. 9, emphasis added)
The EO’s decision to steer clear of the EP’s political work
represents a self-imposed constraint. It does not auto-
matically diminish its independence as a trustee, but it
does create the risk that the EO might be less assertive
when handling cases against the EP that touch on its po-
litical role. This is significant because the distinction be-
tween political and administrative matters is not always
clear-cut, and many of the principles of good administra-
tion which the EO defends (e.g., transparency, absence
of discrimination) can easily have political implications.
In conclusion, we have identified two constraints on
the independence of the EO vis-à-vis the EP. The first
constraint is of a general nature: the EO depends on
the support of the EP in the framework of special re-
ports to persuade the offending EU institutions to follow
its recommendations. To maintain this instrument as a
credible threat—and hence use it to its full potential—
the EO needs to cultivate an overall cooperative rela-
tionship with the EP. The second constraint is more spe-
cific and applies only when the EO deals with complaints
against the EP: here, the EO needs to limit its inquiries to
the administrative aspects of the case. Together, these
two constraints create the risk that, when dealing with
cases against the EP, the EO might be reluctant to de-
cide against the Parliament in general, and especially so
in cases of inquiries that have implications for or touch
upon its political work.
3. Decisions by the Ombudsman Following Inquiries
Against the EP
In this section, we follow up on the observations pre-
sented above by analysing the EO’s performance in cases
where it had to investigate alleged maladministration
within the EP. By focusing on cases, we trace whether the
two constraints identified in the previous section have
had an impact on the EO’s independence.
Before we shed light on the cases against the EP,
these should be set into the political context. Note that
the vast majority of cases handled by the EO concern
the European Commission or EU agencies and not the
EP itself. To give just one example: inquiries conducted
by the EO in 2015 concerned the Commission in 145
cases (or 50.6% of the cases). 30 cases (or 11.5%) fell
within the realm of EU agencies and only 8% (or 21
cases) concerned the EP (EuropeanOmbudsman, 2016c).
Concretely, for the period under examination here—
January 1, 2004, to May 1, 2015—a total of 124 inquiries
were carried out against the Parliament.5
It is noteworthy that in most inquiries against the EP
no maladministration was found, or the institution set-
tled the case: this applies to 83 out of the 124 cases re-
viewed here (in 13 of those instances the Ombudsman
did choose to add further remarks). In the remaining
cases, where the Ombudsman did find that maladminis-
tration had occurred, it issued critical remarks in all but
2 instances.
We used a coding scheme to classify cases according
to subject matter. As shown in Table 1 below, they fall
into two broad categories: first, cases that relate to the
role of the EP as an employer (alleged violations of the
Staff Regulations or selection procedures), and secondly,
cases pertaining to the relationship of the EP with Euro-
pean citizens. The former category is considerably more
numerous than the latter.
To offer an in-depth account of how the Ombuds-
man deals with cases against the EP, in what follows we
discuss several illustrative examples for each of the two
main categories above.
4 For example, a complaint about the position taken by the EP in the context of French nuclear tests in the Pacific was held inadmissible because it
concerned a political decision, not a possible instance of maladministration (European Ombudsman, 1996).
5 We only cover cases opened against the EP as the sole institution, where the EO conducted a formal inquiry. Cases where the complainant withdrew
were not considered. Furthermore, we have included only decisions published on the EO website.
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Table 1. Distribution of cases per subject-matter January 1, 2004–May 1, 2015.
Subject matter Number of cases
A. The EP as an employer: staff matters A.1. Violations of staff regulations6 25
A.2. Violations of staff regulations: financial issues7 25
A.3. Unfair treatment in competition and selection 33
procedures
B. Relations between the EP and EU citizens B.1. Problems with request of information and access 17
to documents8
B.2. Unfair treatment in award of tenders or grants 12
B.3. Access of EU citizens to the EP and treatment 12
of EU citizens by the EP as an institution9
3.1. Cases Related to Staff Matters
To begin with, many (around 20) of the cases concern-
ing alleged violations of staff rules pertain to promotion
issues and specifically to the allocation of the so-called
‘merit points’. These complaints have repeatedly given
rise to findings of maladministration, and the EO has
striven to use some of them as basis for defining best
practices of general applicability. In one interesting case,
which related to lack of impartiality in the award of merit
points for an EP official, the Ombudsman was even re-
quested to consider submitting a special report to the EP.
He did not do so, justifying that the case was ‘not impor-
tant enough to merit Parliament’s attention in its role as
a political body designed to represent EU citizens’ (see
case 3289/2008/BEH). The EO, however, issued a critical
remark urging the Parliament to avoid situations where
the person or authority called upon to decide on staff
matters could be perceived as partial (the case at hand
concerned the Secretary-General of the Parliament).
The EO has also striven to establish best practices
with staff cases that entailed financial implications, and
with cases concerning competition and selection pro-
cedures, often advocating for the EP to enhance the
transparency of the decisions it takes. For instance, in
case 3732/2004/GG, further remarks were issued, urg-
ing the EP to consider measures whereby persons deal-
ing with tenders would be asked not only to declare any
potential conflicts of interests, but also to provide rele-
vant information on any previous dealings with, or ac-
tivities involving the tenderers. In case 2222/2004/TN,
where a participant in a selection procedure was ex-
cluded due to lack of professional experience, the EP
committed—at the EO’s behest—to provide more infor-
mation and clarify certain requirements regarding future
recruitment procedures.
In other inquiries, however, the Ombudsman has
limited its intervention to finding a way of reconciling
the complainant and the Parliament. For instance, a re-
cent decision concerned an EP official who had been
granted derogation from the mobility policy that had
been put in place, because of her daughter’s severe and
irreversible disease. The EP administration decided to
disregard this derogation, which led the complainant
to approach the Ombudsman. The EO concluded that
the EP could ‘not lawfully revoke its derogation’ (case
118/2013/AN). Although the Parliament refused to ac-
knowledge that its positionwas unwarranted, it did even-
tually accept the EO’s recommendation to respect the
complainant’s derogation.
3.2. Cases Concerning the Relationship with EU Citizens
Cases concerning how the EP interacts with EU citizens—
when it comes access to documents and transparency—
highlight the tensions inherent in the relationship with
the Parliament, as they tend to often touch on its ‘politi-
cal’ role, also in the field of external relations. The con-
troversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
has brought the Ombudsman two interesting complaints
that are illustrative of these dynamics.
Firstly, case 2393/2011/RA concerns the EP’s re-
fusal to grant the complainant public access to doc-
uments regarding the negotiations leading up to the
finalisation of ACTA. While no maladministration was
found (the EP had validly invoked exceptions provided
for in Regulation 1049/2001), the EO issued further re-
marks where she highlighted the EP’s position as the
legislature representing all EU citizens. Accordingly, the
Parliament—as a ‘political body’—was called upon to in-
tervene with the Commission and the Council to ensure
that, in future, the ‘very nature of Parliament, which is
6 Amajority of these cases (around 20) cover issues such as promotions within EP on the basis of annual staff assessments, which can result in the award
of a certain number of merit points. One exceptional case of alleged harassment of a EP staff member also falls into this category.
7 This category covers issues such as award of allowances and reimbursement of pension costs.
8 Issues with the EP website also fall into this category.
9 Within this category fall issues such as the question of access to the EP as an institution or the issue of access of visitor groups or treatment of individuals
by EP security services.
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to openly deliberate on such issues’, is not undermined
(European Ombudsman, 2011).
Secondly, case 262/2012/OV stemmed from a com-
plaint regarding the refusal of public access to the min-
utes of meetings of coordinators of several EP Commit-
tees relating to the ACTA negotiations (see Abazi & Adri-
aensen, 2017). After some debate regarding the status of
these documents (the EP claimed that therewere no sep-
arate minutes of meetings of committee coordinators,
rather that these were included in the minutes of the
committee meetings themselves) the Parliament agreed
to the Ombudsman’s recommendation that decisions or
recommendations adopted by the coordinators would,
after their endorsement by the respective EP committee,
be included in the committeeminutes, and be accessible
via the public register as of July 2014 onwards. The Om-
budsman expressed her hope that ‘for the sake of consis-
tency’ the rule would also be applied retrospectively, for
the 2009–2014 parliamentary term (case 262/2012/OV).
Another two significant cases—this time concerning
the internal rather than the external dimension of EU
politics—have raised questions regarding financial trans-
parency in MEPs’ activity, thus also touching on the po-
litical role of the Parliament. In one case, dating back to
2005, the EOdealtwith a journalist’s complaint regarding
the refusal of Parliament to give public access to details
regardingMEP’s allowances, allegedly on grounds of data
protection (case 3643/2005/(GK)WP). After consulting
with the European Data Protection Supervisor—who ad-
vocated that the public has a right to be informed about
the behaviour of MEPs—the Ombudsman called on the
EP to disclose the requested information. The EP refused
(again invoking data protection), but announced that it
would publish general information on MEPs’ allowances
and alluded to the possibility of re-assessing the situa-
tion in 2009. TheOmbudsman consequently issued a crit-
ical remark and through media coverage, the case gave
rise to amore general debate onMEPs’ allowances in the
public domain.
In a somewhat related case, the Parliament refused
to give access to the list of MEPs participating in the EP’s
supplementary pension scheme. The Ombudsmanmade
a preliminary finding of maladministration and proposed
a friendly solution, which the EP rejected. Significantly,
the Parliament as a whole voted down a concrete pro-
posal from its own Budgetary Control Committee to pub-
lish this list of names. The Ombudsman thus decided to
close the case as the EP’s action had made the issue one
of ‘political responsibility’, on which as a legislature it
would be accountable to the European electorate, and
not the EO.
3.3. The Roles of the EO vis-à-vis the EP
The review of cases conducted above brings to the fore
twomain roles that the EO plays vis-à-vis the EP: ‘arbitra-
tor’ and ‘transparency watchdog’. In the first role, the EO
focuses primarily on finding a solution that allows for rec-
onciliation between the complainant and the EP. In most
cases this leads to a settlement. When playing the ‘arbi-
trator’ role, the EO often tries to set ‘best practices’ con-
cerning good administrationwithin the EP, by giving guid-
ance beyond the specific issue or case at stake. In its sec-
ond role—‘transparency watchdog’—the Ombudsman’s
focus is on requesting that the EP put certain documents
into the public domain, or—failing that—on stimulating
public debate and interest regarding EP documents.
Returning to the categories identified in Table 1, the
distribution of these two roles is as follows. Firstly, with
inquiries concerning violations of staff regulations (with
or without financial implications), and the treatment of
citizens by the EP as an institution (i.e., sub-categories
A.1, A.2, and B.3), the EO performs the role of arbitrator.
The cases concerning promotion decisions and the alloca-
tion ofmerit points, discussed briefly in the previous sub-
section, provide a relevant illustration. Secondly, with
cases concerning requests for information and access
to documents (sub-category B.1), the EO acts as trans-
parency watchdog, as exemplified in the ACTA inquiries
and the case on MEPs’ allowances. Finally, in cases deal-
ing with unfair treatment, either in competition and se-
lection procedures (sub-category A.3), or in the award of
tenders or grants (sub-category B.2), the EO acts mainly
as an arbitrator, but it sometimes chooses to take on the
role of transparency watchdog as well, by urging the EP
to offer more information as to why certain decisions
were taken. Therefore, in these few selected instances,
the EO plays both roles simultaneously. This is exempli-
fied in two cases presented above: case 3732/2004/GG
and case 2222/2004/TN.
What does this tell us about the independence of
the EO vis-à-vis the EP? Firstly, both roles identified
above presume that the EO has positioned itself against
the (short-term) interests of the Parliament. Thus, when
acting as arbitrator, the EO has pushed the EP to ac-
knowledge (and rectify) certain shortcomings in its han-
dling of staff matters and other administrative issues.
As a transparency watchdog, the EO has similarly ad-
vocated that the EP disclose information which it obvi-
ously preferred—at the time—to keep out of the pub-
lic domain. This is indeed the sort of behaviour that one
might expect of a trustee, which executes its mandate in
line with relevant professional norms and their own best
judgement, and can, therefore, take actions against its
principal(s). The cases analysed here show that the first
constraint identified in section 2—the EO’s reliance on
a cooperative relationship with the EP—does not under-
mine the EO’s capacity to act independently.
However—and this is an important point—many of
the cases that come to the attention of the EO do not
have systemic value, and hence the two roles identified
here do not carry equal weight. Generally speaking, in-
quiries related to staff matters concern the grievances
of specific individuals, and although some of these may
have a broader relevance, the interested audience is still
relatively contained. Cases that pertain to the relation-
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ship between the EP and European citizens, however, are
quite different, because they often touch on the EP’s po-
litical role as a democratic representative institution. In
this context, the EO acting as a ‘transparency watchdog’
was particularly challenging for the EP, because the in-
formation requested by some complainants was of such
nature as to empower citizens to hold MEPs account-
able. These less numerous but far more significant cases,
therefore, represent a tougher test for the independence
of the EO, and our analysis has shown that here the Om-
budsman has spoken out against the EP (for instance by
issuing critical remarks). Thus, we can conclude that the
second constraint identified in section 2, regarding cases
with a political substance, also does not seem to under-
mine the EO’s capacity to act independently.
4. The Relationship with the EP in the Context of
Own-Initiative Inquiries
The EO’s performance in the context of own-initiative
inquiries lends further insight into its relationship with
the EP. This is because the EO enjoys full discretion in
choosing the issues to be investigated in the framework
of these inquiries—in other words, this instrument al-
lows the EO to set its own agenda. Thus, own-initiative
inquiries are very different from regular cases, which ac-
count for most of the EO’s activity, but where the space
formanoeuvre is confined to the complaints received. By
contrast, here the EO is a pro-active actor, which makes
own-initiative inquiries particularly significant for assess-
ing its independence.
During the period considered here (2004–2015), the
EO opened 43 own-initiative inquiries. It is telling that
most of these concerned either the Commission or Euro-
pean agencies, and nonewere directed specifically at the
EP. However, there have been four ‘horizontal’ inquiries
(i.e., dealing with a specific subject and encompassing
several European institutions) which have involved the
EP, all of them carried out after 2010. Out of these four
horizontal inquiries, case OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the
transparency of the so-called trilogues is by far the most
consequential and has the potential to stimulate a new
level of openness in what has traditionally been a tightly
closed-door decision-making process. This is thus a perti-
nent test case when it comes to role that the EO assumes
as a trustee vis a vis the EP.
Trilogues are informal tripartite meetings attended
by representatives of the EP, the Council and the Com-
mission. The level of secrecy inherent in trilogues is de-
fended by the institutions as necessary to find a common
positionwithin theOrdinary Legislative Procedure in first
reading without the pressure and exposure of the regu-
lar legislative process (Reh, Héritier, Bressanelli, & Koop,
2013). TheOmbudsman’s inquiry indicated that trilogues
are ‘increasingly heralded as the place where the negoti-
ated content of the final legislation text is decided upon’,
and asked for clarifications regarding: whether and how
upcoming trilogues are publicly announced; the docu-
ments produced by each institution in the context of tri-
logues; the public accessibility of these documents (in-
cluding any requests for public access received in relation
to these); and, finally, the language regime of trilogues
(case OI/8/2015/JAS).
The trilogues inquiry proved controversial, with all
three institutions openly stating that it partly exceeded
the Ombudsman’s mandate. The EP’s response was the
least outspoken. It merely indicated that the EO’s ques-
tions required careful consideration given ‘the fact that
trilogues are an expression of the more political role
of the Parliament’, and pointed out that while the han-
dling of requests for information regarding trilogue doc-
uments represents an administrative exercise, the orga-
nization of the trilogues as such (including the regime
of minutes, the languages used etc.) was rather within
the legislators’ prerogatives and hence outside the EO’s
mandate (Schulz, 2015). The Commission and Council es-
sentially advanced the same arguments, but the tone of
their letters was certainly more outspoken than the EP’s.
The Council in particular chose to remind the Ombuds-
man of its own established practice of distinguishing be-
tween questions that pertain to the political responsibil-
ity of the EU legislators, and those that involve possible
maladministration. (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 2015).
Despite the tense situation, all three institutions even-
tually responded to the EO’s questions and allowed her
team to conduct the desired document inspections. On
this basis, the EO issued a series of recommendations to
make trilogue documentation publicly available.10 The EO
further noted that someof this information could bemade
available while trilogues were ongoing, whereas other as-
pectsmight have towait until after their conclusion. In par-
ticular, the EO highlighted the value of transparency for
building up citizens’ trust in governing institutions:
If citizens are to participate effectively in the demo-
cratic life of the European Union, by holding their rep-
resentatives to account, and by voicing their opinion,
then they need access to this information….This goes
to the heart of EU law-making legitimacy. (European
Ombudsman, 2016b)
In conclusion, in the concrete case of the trilogues in-
quiry, the EOhas successfully tested the limits of herman-
date, by obtaining cooperation in a matter that was con-
sidered to bite intowhatmay have previously been taboo
territory, namely the political activity of the EP. From
this perspective, the trilogues inquiry represents a game-
changer not only regarding transparency practices in the
EU but also the relationship between the EO and the EP.
The own initiative inquiry on transparency and
public participation in the TTIP negotiations (case
OI/11/2014/RA) is of similar magnitude to the trilogues
10 Among others, these documents concern trilogues dates and agendas, the initial positions of the three institutions, the so-called ‘four-column’ docu-
ments, the final compromise texts, and a list of the political decision-makers involved.
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inquiry, in that it represents a bold push for transparency
in a domain of activity traditionally characterised by
secrecy—in this case, international trade negotiations.
Although the EP is not directly targeted in this inquiry, we
discuss it here given its strategic significance, and to con-
trast it with the trilogues inquiry where the Ombudsman
did directly challenge the EP (alongside the Commission
and the Council).
The background of this case is that the European
Commission is currently negotiating a wide-ranging
trade and investment partnership agreement with the
United States (TTIP). The negotiations have attracted ‘un-
precedented public interest’. In July 2014, the Ombuds-
man opened an own-initiative inquiry, which was justi-
fied as responding to concerns raised by the EP together
with civil society actors. The inquiry endedwith the Coun-
cil and the Commission agreeing to the pro-active publi-
cation of a range of relevant documents, including the
EU’s negotiating directives and opening positions.
What we see in this case is a prime example of how
the EP and the EO ‘join forces’, which is clearly a dif-
ferent dynamic compared to the trilogues inquiry. How-
ever, in both inquiries, the EO was equally bold in her
push for more transparency. This bodes well for the in-
dependence of the institution. Also significant is that in
the TTIP case the EO has chosen to stress the role of the
EP as the only directly elected EU institution. Thus, she
explicitly pointed to the special ‘democratic responsibil-
ity of elected representatives, at the European and na-
tional levels, in scrutinising the negotiations on behalf of
their constituents’. While she acknowledged that there
may always be circumstances in which elected represen-
tatives will have ‘privileged access’, the direct involve-
ment of citizens is to be encouraged as much as possible
(case OI/11/2014/RA). This shows that while in the TTIP
inquiry the EO has responded to the concerns of the Eu-
ropean legislature, and their interests were aligned, the
Ombudsman did not act as an auxiliary organ of the EP,
but rather used the opportunity to point out that the Par-
liament also has its own responsibility in ensuring trans-
parency in international trade negotiations.
Before concluding, it should be stressed that EO’s
decisions in both the trilogues and the TTIP inquiries
were preceded by public consultations. In recent years
this tool has been used regularly in connection with
own-initiative inquiries: seven of the own-initiative in-
quiries closed since 2010 have incorporated public con-
sultations. By voluntarily using this instrument (no men-
tion of it exists in the EO’s statute or in the implement-
ing provisions) the EO makes her office a ‘vessel’ for the
voices of NGOs and citizens, which in turn strengthens
her stance vis-à-vis other European Institutions. Thus,
when looking at own-initiative inquiries, we can distin-
guish a third role that the EO plays, mostly in relation to
other institutions, but also—albeit exceptionally—vis-à-
vis the EP, as illustrated with the trilogues inquiry. This
role of ‘vessel’ for civil society concerns is clearly linked
to that of ‘transparency watchdog’, but it also goes be-
yond it. The EO does not act on behalf of a case that is
brought to it by one or several parties (as in the ACTA
case, for instance), but actively asks for input by citizens
and NGOs, and thus creates a larger democratic basis
for her actions. To be clear, the consultations serve not
only to provide the Ombudsman with more relevant in-
formation, but also to justify the societal relevance of the
own-initiative inquiries, and to shore up the kind of pop-
ular support which might strengthen its stance against
the institutions that are subject to these inquiries. There-
fore, with the role of ‘vessel’, the EO as a trustee seeks
to demonstrate that it is acting on behalf of (represent-
ing) civil society concerns, i.e. a third party (a beneficiary)
that is distinct from EP. Hence, this role can be seen as
signalling the Ombudsman’s independence.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This article pursued the question of whether the EO acts
as an ‘independent’ institution towards the EP. This is a
pertinent question because the two institutions are in
a principal-trustee type of relationship. Thus, the EO is
appointed exclusively by the EP, with no role to play for
other EU institutions or Member States. The EO can be
removed by the Court of Justice of the EU only at the
request of the EP, inter alia if he is guilty of serious mis-
conduct. On the other hand, however, the EP is among
the EU institutions and bodies covered by the EO’s man-
date.While the political activity of the Parliament, includ-
ing the work of its committees, remains outside the EO’s
remit, it does have the power to probe into questions of
maladministration within the Parliament and to examine
issues such as the refusal of access to documents or de-
cisions taken in competitions and selection procedures.
In looking at how the EO acts vis-à-vis the EP, an institu-
tion it partly depends upon, this article deals with a ‘hard
case’ for the EO’s independence. Thus, the analysis con-
ducted here is relevant for the general performance of
the EO as a guardian of good administration in the EU.
The concept of ‘independence’ is (obviously) not only
far-reaching but also difficult to operationalize. We have
opted to discern patterns of interaction between the two
institutions, by probing into all cases brought forward to
the EO against the EP over a time-span of more than 10
years. We then inductively established reoccurring roles
the Ombudsman adopts via the European legislature.
Findings show that in the majority of cases no malad-
ministration was found, or the EP settled the case. Thus,
the most common role played by the EO is that of ‘ar-
bitrator’ between the complainant(s) and the EP. The
caseswheremaladministrationwas found concerned, on
one hand, (alleged) violations of staff regulations, and,
on the other hand, the Parliament’s relation to EU citi-
zens. Here the Ombudsman played its ‘arbitrator’ role,
but also that of ‘transparency watchdog’ (by ensuring
that certain documents are made public, or by bringing
certain topics into the public debate). Finally, the two
own-initiative inquiries reviewed here—on trilogues and
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on the TTIP negotiations—reveal a third role assumed
by the EO, namely that of ‘vessel for civil society con-
cerns’. This is closely allied with the role of ‘transparency
watchdog’ and represents a more recent development,
as public consultations have been a feature of (some)
own-initiative inquiries only in the past few years.
The roles summarised above demonstrate that the
EO acts as an ‘independent’ actor. From this perspective,
the caseswhere transparency represents a core issue are
themost significant, as they tend to concern the EP as an
institution at the heart of the ‘democratic life of the EU’
and as such clearly touch on its political responsibility.
Here the Ombudsman faces clear limits to its mandate,
and it has generally confined the inquiries to the legal el-
ements of the case (i.e., the respect for rules governing
public access to information). Some of these cases, how-
ever, had political repercussions for the Parliament, and
thus their salience lies in their ‘spin off’ effects. On one
hand, debates about sensitive issues such as the MEPs’
allowances have shifted into the public domain, and pres-
sure formore transparency increased.On theother hand,
more political debate within the EP itself was generated,
along with concrete action points.
In the context of own-initiative inquiries, the EO has
more clearly entered ‘political’ territory, on issues per-
taining to both the internal politics of the EU, as well as
its external relations. Both the trilogues and the TTIP in-
quiries have pushed the boundaries of institutional trans-
parency within the EU in significant ways. In these con-
texts, the Ombudsman has called upon the EP to exercise
its role as a representative institution.
Overall, the role of the EO seems to have evolved
over time and it has consistently not shied away from
assuming its role as an independent institution also to-
wards the EP.
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